Medeshi Jan 4, 2009
Kenya, Uganda look on nervously as 2009 heralds Somalia chaos
(Photo: Somali al-Shabaab insurgents arrive in Mogadishu on Decemcer 27, 2008. The insurgents have vowed to continue waging war until Somalia becomes an Islamic state.)By FRED OLUOCH
Does Somalia have any chance of ever returning to peace?
That is the question on everyone’s lips as debate rages over whether the recent resignation of president Abdullahi Yusuf could further destabilise Somalia or present an opportunity for a fresh, workable realignment of forces in the country.
Abdullahi, who was elected to head the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 in Nairobi, has achieved very little in the years since and was of late seen as a stumbling block rather than an agent of the restoration of peace in Somalia.
While the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, beginning Friday last week, has also added to the anxiety, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the mandate of the TFG is scheduled to end by December 2009 and attempts to renew the mandate of a government that does not enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the people will only lead to further divisions.
Experts in Somali affairs such as Bethuel Kiplagat are now urging all interested parties in Somalia, especially the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad), to move quickly to ensure that the Somalia peace process holds.
However, Mr Kiplagat — the Kenyan diplomat who was the chief mediator in the Somali peace talks — is optimistic that the TFG can pick up from where Abdullahi Yusuf left off if the Somalis stick to the Charter that was agreed upon in Nairobi in 2004.
That Charter (constitution) stipulates that a president can either resign or be impeached, to be replaced by the Speaker of parliament; and the Speaker, Sheikh Aden Madobe, has duly taken over.
Mr Kiplagat’s view is in line with those who see the exit of Abdullahi Yusuf and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces as an opportunity to re-launch a credible political process that could bring together the TFG and the Islamic moderates, the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, which signed the Djibouti Accord in August last year.
The question is whether the parliament will remain intact or disintegrate, given that it is composed of former warlords, including Abdullahi Yusuf himself, who were all included as Members of Parliament to block them from returning to their clan or sectional enclaves and resuming fighting among themselves.
Once the Ethiopians complete their withdrawal, the small, ill-equipped African Union force may well follow suit if other African states do not quickly send more peacekeeping personnel to Somalia.
The hardline militants, al-Shabaab, have vowed to continue waging war until Somalia becomes an Islamic state.
There may be brief anxiety following Abdullahi Yusuf’s resignation and the Ethiopian withdrawal, but if the Somalis can hold on to the Charter, then stability could just be attained.
“The point is that you cannot continue to have a government that does not enjoy the support of the people and it is time the parties embrace the Djibouti Accord if the peace process is to succeed,” said Mr Kiplagat.
The Djibouti Accord was signed in August 2008 and brought together the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the former leader of the Union of Islamic Courts.
The objective was to create a powerful political alliance, capable of stabilising the country, marginalising the radicals and stemming the tide of Islamist militancy.
One of the major aspects of this agreement was the decision to increase the number of MPs from the current 275 to 500, making room for the moderate Islamists and other interest groups.
Mr Kiplagat believes that the expansion of parliament is possible provided they follow the constitution on how to appoint extra MPs, using the agreed 4.5 formula.
This means, the appointments must take into account the four major clans, and the five smaller clans grouped into one unit.
Their selection will involve traditional and political leaders, the question being whether this selection can be done before or after the Islamists agree to a power-sharing arrangement. The MPs will then elect a new president.
Still, the focus will be on Abdullahi Yusuf, who immediately after resigning retreated to his former base in Puntland, raising fears that he is planning to entrench himself in the semi-autonomous region and could refuse to co-operate with the future leader of the TFG.
He has been blamed for failing to transform TFG into a government that enjoys legitimacy among the population.
He has had a shaky relationship with top officials of his government, beginning with his differences with the former speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden.
A former warlord in the semi-autonomous Puntland, Abdullahi Yusuf was always considered too close to Ethiopia to bring the rest of the country together.
Ethiopia and Somalia have a historic rivalry going back centuries and Abdullahi Yusuf was basically seen as a stooge by many who still harbour deep suspicion of Ethiopia’s designs, especially Addis Ababa’s policy in the Ogaden region, with its ethnic Somali population.
Under Abdullahi Yusuf’s leadership, the TFG failed over four years to create a broad-based government, with the president facing accusations of marginalising large parts of the population and exacerbating existing divisions.
No part of the mandate that the TFG was given in 2004 has been implemented.
This mandate included peace and reconciliation through a structured national healing programme, the strengthening of the federal regions and the democratisation of Somalia through a national general election.
The nadir of his inability to govern and lead the reconciliation process came with his botched last-minute attempt to sack Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein.
The challenge for the next TFG leader is that a section of Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, led by the controversial Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, had earlier maintained that it would not join the peace process when the Ethiopians go, nor work with TFG.
Mr Aweys, who is based in Eritrea, refused to participate in the Djibouti talks and Somali observers suspect that he is more sympathetic to al-Shabaab, which he credits for defeating the TFG.
Equally significant is what steps the US takes following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the resurgence of the Islamic militants.
In late 2006, Ethiopian troops, with the support of the US, entered Somalia to oust the Islamic government, which the Pentagon suspected of harbouring Al Qaeda operatives.
Today, the Islamists are back, waging a brutal insurgency that has killed thousands of people and steadily gained ground against the Ethiopians, the TFG and their allies.
Taking advantage of a power struggle inside the transitional government, al-Shabaab has already pushed within a few kilometres of Mogadishu, previously an Ethiopian and TFG stronghold.
Does Somalia have any chance of ever returning to peace?
That is the question on everyone’s lips as debate rages over whether the recent resignation of president Abdullahi Yusuf could further destabilise Somalia or present an opportunity for a fresh, workable realignment of forces in the country.
Abdullahi, who was elected to head the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 in Nairobi, has achieved very little in the years since and was of late seen as a stumbling block rather than an agent of the restoration of peace in Somalia.
While the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, beginning Friday last week, has also added to the anxiety, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the mandate of the TFG is scheduled to end by December 2009 and attempts to renew the mandate of a government that does not enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the people will only lead to further divisions.
Experts in Somali affairs such as Bethuel Kiplagat are now urging all interested parties in Somalia, especially the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad), to move quickly to ensure that the Somalia peace process holds.
However, Mr Kiplagat — the Kenyan diplomat who was the chief mediator in the Somali peace talks — is optimistic that the TFG can pick up from where Abdullahi Yusuf left off if the Somalis stick to the Charter that was agreed upon in Nairobi in 2004.
That Charter (constitution) stipulates that a president can either resign or be impeached, to be replaced by the Speaker of parliament; and the Speaker, Sheikh Aden Madobe, has duly taken over.
Mr Kiplagat’s view is in line with those who see the exit of Abdullahi Yusuf and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces as an opportunity to re-launch a credible political process that could bring together the TFG and the Islamic moderates, the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, which signed the Djibouti Accord in August last year.
The question is whether the parliament will remain intact or disintegrate, given that it is composed of former warlords, including Abdullahi Yusuf himself, who were all included as Members of Parliament to block them from returning to their clan or sectional enclaves and resuming fighting among themselves.
Once the Ethiopians complete their withdrawal, the small, ill-equipped African Union force may well follow suit if other African states do not quickly send more peacekeeping personnel to Somalia.
The hardline militants, al-Shabaab, have vowed to continue waging war until Somalia becomes an Islamic state.
There may be brief anxiety following Abdullahi Yusuf’s resignation and the Ethiopian withdrawal, but if the Somalis can hold on to the Charter, then stability could just be attained.
“The point is that you cannot continue to have a government that does not enjoy the support of the people and it is time the parties embrace the Djibouti Accord if the peace process is to succeed,” said Mr Kiplagat.
The Djibouti Accord was signed in August 2008 and brought together the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the former leader of the Union of Islamic Courts.
The objective was to create a powerful political alliance, capable of stabilising the country, marginalising the radicals and stemming the tide of Islamist militancy.
One of the major aspects of this agreement was the decision to increase the number of MPs from the current 275 to 500, making room for the moderate Islamists and other interest groups.
Mr Kiplagat believes that the expansion of parliament is possible provided they follow the constitution on how to appoint extra MPs, using the agreed 4.5 formula.
This means, the appointments must take into account the four major clans, and the five smaller clans grouped into one unit.
Their selection will involve traditional and political leaders, the question being whether this selection can be done before or after the Islamists agree to a power-sharing arrangement. The MPs will then elect a new president.
Still, the focus will be on Abdullahi Yusuf, who immediately after resigning retreated to his former base in Puntland, raising fears that he is planning to entrench himself in the semi-autonomous region and could refuse to co-operate with the future leader of the TFG.
He has been blamed for failing to transform TFG into a government that enjoys legitimacy among the population.
He has had a shaky relationship with top officials of his government, beginning with his differences with the former speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden.
A former warlord in the semi-autonomous Puntland, Abdullahi Yusuf was always considered too close to Ethiopia to bring the rest of the country together.
Ethiopia and Somalia have a historic rivalry going back centuries and Abdullahi Yusuf was basically seen as a stooge by many who still harbour deep suspicion of Ethiopia’s designs, especially Addis Ababa’s policy in the Ogaden region, with its ethnic Somali population.
Under Abdullahi Yusuf’s leadership, the TFG failed over four years to create a broad-based government, with the president facing accusations of marginalising large parts of the population and exacerbating existing divisions.
No part of the mandate that the TFG was given in 2004 has been implemented.
This mandate included peace and reconciliation through a structured national healing programme, the strengthening of the federal regions and the democratisation of Somalia through a national general election.
The nadir of his inability to govern and lead the reconciliation process came with his botched last-minute attempt to sack Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein.
The challenge for the next TFG leader is that a section of Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, led by the controversial Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, had earlier maintained that it would not join the peace process when the Ethiopians go, nor work with TFG.
Mr Aweys, who is based in Eritrea, refused to participate in the Djibouti talks and Somali observers suspect that he is more sympathetic to al-Shabaab, which he credits for defeating the TFG.
Equally significant is what steps the US takes following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the resurgence of the Islamic militants.
In late 2006, Ethiopian troops, with the support of the US, entered Somalia to oust the Islamic government, which the Pentagon suspected of harbouring Al Qaeda operatives.
Today, the Islamists are back, waging a brutal insurgency that has killed thousands of people and steadily gained ground against the Ethiopians, the TFG and their allies.
Taking advantage of a power struggle inside the transitional government, al-Shabaab has already pushed within a few kilometres of Mogadishu, previously an Ethiopian and TFG stronghold.
